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On October 23rd, 1956 a group of 200,000 protesters, mostly students, marched to
the parliament building in Hungary and removed a statue of Stalin that had been erected
several years earlier. The protesters than marched to the Radio Budapest building in order
to broadcast their demands against the Soviet rule that had taken power in Hungary.
Upon arriving to the Radio Budapest building the protesters were met by the AVH, a
Soviet police force created to keep order throughout occupied Eastern European nations.
Amidst the chaos tear gas was thrown into the crowd of protesters, and the AVH opened
fire. Hungarian soldiers refused orders by the Communist leaders to help put down the
revolt, and instead joined the side of their fellow countrymen. What ensued was twelve
days of violence in which the Communist leaders fled Hungary until Soviet tanks were
able to regain control. But what led to one of the most violent phases of the Cold War
that fall day in Hungary? After almost six years why did the citizens finally revolt against
their oppressive government? While many factors played key roles into the revolution in
Hungary, the messages broadcast by Radio Free Europe convinced the citizens to
violently rise against the communist leaders, suggesting help from the West would come.
The revolt against communism in 1956 was against the regime that had taken over
just ten years earlier. After WWII, the Soviet military occupied Hungary, gradually
replacing the freely elected government with appointed Communist leaders. In 1948
Matyas Rakosi was appointed leader of Hungary and the Stalinist-Communism takeover
was complete. During Rakosi’s reign, the citizens of Hungary saw a drastic decrease in
economic success and almost the entire elimination of human rights and freedoms. The
methods of Stalinism included the collectivization of agriculture and rapid
industrialization, which cost many farmers money and the entire country food, virtually
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eliminated all due process of law, and massive political purges against those who
disagreed with the parties policies. However, in March of 1953 Stalin died, and the future
of Stalin’s brand of Communism in Eastern Europe was in question. Imre Nagy, a
popular Communist politician, was elected Prime Minister and conditions immediately
began improving. Nagy was known as a Socialist Communist, one who believed in
human rights and equality. During his first reign as Prime Minister, Hungarians saw an
immediate loosening up of the authoritarian Communism that had existed. But by 1955
Nagy and his Socialist Democratic ideals had fallen out of favor by the new Soviet
politicians led by Khrushchev, and he was removed from office. Under Erno Gero the
new Prime Minister, the authoritarian Communist government was back in power. In
February of 1956, newly appointed leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, gave
a speech to the members of his congress denouncing Stalin and his methods of leadership.
He denounced Stalin’s abuse of purges during the Second World War, and accused the
former leader of taking advantage of Communism for personal gain. For the first time
since the Soviet Revolution of 1917 Communist officials were questioning their own
methods. After the removal of Nagy, who had introduced freedom from a Communist
leader that Hungarians weren’t used to, along with the questioning of politics and policies
of the Soviet Union from Khrushchev, Hungarian citizens began to question the role of
Stalinism in their country. The unrest from these events helped lead to the Revolution
that took place in October of 1956.
Radio Free Europe had been broadcasting into Hungary since its creation in 1949.
RFE was created in part by the United States CIA along with other nations in Western
Europe who feared the spread of Communism. It was created to broadcast unbiased news
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from the democratic nations, and to inspire the citizens of Eastern Europe to protest
against their Communist governments. The initial goal of Radio Free Europe was to
simply broadcast news from the West into the Satellite countries where information was
filtered and edited by the Communist governments. The goals of RFE were clear from the
beginning: to bring down Soviet control in Eastern Europe. When President Eisenhower
was elected president in 1953 the use of Radio Free Europe changed. Frank Winser was
an American Secret Service Agent during WWII, and served as a spy in Berlin and
Vienna in the early years after the war. The United States government put him in charge
of a propaganda department in which over 3,000 people were on payroll in an effort to
eliminate all support for Communism in Eastern Europe.1 The death of Stalin in 1953 left
the future of Stalinism in Eastern Europe in question, and the United States viewed it as
their prime chance to bring down Soviet control in the region. Winser believed that the
most effective way to spread the “voice of liberty” into Eastern Europe would involve
RFE. Within 18 months of Eisenhower’s election in 1953 Winser had the station
broadcasting anti-communist propaganda. The early propaganda group was the initial
foundation of the CIA, with Winser becoming known as one of the founding fathers. 2
After Winser took charge of RFE, a new handbook informed the employees of RFE what
was expected while on the air:
Broadcasts should emphasize Western determination to undermine Communist
regimes… The station’s purpose is to contribute to the liberation of the nations
imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by maintaining their morale and stimulating in
them a spirit of non-cooperation with the Soviet-Dominated regimes. 3

1

Victor Sebestyen, Twelve Days: The Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (New York:
Pantheon Books, 2006), 58.
2
Ibid.
3
Sebestyen, 59.
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While RFE earned the reputation as being truthful in the first four years of its existence, it
was very clear that the intentions of the station were changed to create unrest in the
Satellite countries.
While Social and governmental issues in Hungary sparked unrest, the use of
Radio Free Europe as a propaganda tool directly led to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.
The radio reports were used to influence the citizens listening to take action, and in some
cases to take up arms against the communist governments in charge. While it quickly
became clear that Western nations had no intentions to intervene, they were still willing
to offer tactical plans over the air. The Hungarians were just another piece of the chess
board for the United States and the Soviet Union, but for the Hungarians themselves,
their entire lives were affected for the worse from the whole ordeal.
Historians have viewed the uprising from several different vantage points since
the revolution in 1956. Different historians state different events that drove the
Hungarians to revolt against the Soviets, but don’t discuss why the Hungarians believed
they could win. A rebellious group of students wouldn’t seem to stand a chance against a
trained and organized world wide power like the Soviet army, and yet the students took
arms anyway. Why have historians ignored the reasons that drove the revolution from a
desire to an actual event? The values of those authors who have looked at the revolution
will be vital to understanding this. The Hungarian Revolution came during the Cold War,
a time where people viewed the world issues as good versus evil, Capitalism versus
Communism, the United States versus the Soviet Union.
Many of the early Historians who wrote about the Hungarian Revolution had been
actively involved in the fighting. Those historians from Hungary have been unwilling to
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blame themselves for what took place, and instead have simply focused on the misdeeds
and horrendous actions taken by the Soviets to combat the uprising. English speaking
historians who fought during the Revolution are even less credible. These historians were
outsiders from either Western Europe or the United States, and entered Hungary to
defend Capitalism and the freedom of democracy. Due to their involvement in the
revolution as well as their relationship to the West, their views are skewed when it comes
to the role of propaganda from the West. Later historians focused on the Hungarian
Revolution and its relationship to the Cold War. While the involvement of the revolution
as a part of the Cold War is extremely important, many of these historians ignore it as an
individual event, and thus downplay the causes of the revolution and the impact of Radio
Free Europe. Many of these historians have also created articles and books portraying the
Hungarians as martyrs for democracy, and concluded that the Soviet Union was solely to
blame for the violent episode that took place. Not until recently have historians began to
study the causes of the revolution and the possible role that RFE had in causing the
students to take arms against the Soviet Union.
One of the early historians involved in the fighting was Michael Korda. Korda
was a student at Oxford when the revolution began, and he and several of his friends
traveled to Budapest to help with medicine supplies as well as assisting in the fight
against Soviet soldiers. Fifty years after he took part in the revolution, Korda wrote
Journey to a Revolution, a personal memoir and history of the Hungarian Revolution.
Korda viewed the revolution as a tipping point, even stating that the “collapse of the
Soviet Union itself could be traced back to the consequences of the uprising in the streets
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of Budapest.” 4 Korda, writing fifty years after the revolution, obviously has strong
personal beliefs that the revolution was one of the greatest moments in history, as he was
involved first hand. But the fact that he was involved, as he puts it, on the side of the
“Independent, Democratic” Hungarians skews his views. He certainly believes that the
Soviets were completely to blame for the violent revolution.
The book is an excellent source to help paint the picture of the chaos that existed
in the fall of 1956, but it doesn’t present the events from both sides. The book is
enjoyable in that it is the first hand account of a man who was actively involved in the
uprising, but as an outsider from England volunteering to enter Hungary, it is impossible
to take his point of view without questioning its authenticity. The reason Korda went to
Hungary was to fight for democracy against the Communist government, so it is
understandable that he is going to be unwilling to blame his own government and its push
for democracy for what took place. Korda downplays the role of RFE broadcasts in
stating that:
For years Radio Free Europe, broadcasting from Munich, had been urging the
people of the “captive nations” to rise against the Russians, and promising help
from the West when they did so. Much as these broadcasts irritated communist
governments, it is doubtful that anyone else took them all that seriously. 5
Rather, Korda believes that what took place was a random uprising against a tyrant
regime. While it was a “revolution against eleven years of alien, heavy-handed,
unyielding Russian domination and occupation,” 6 he also saw it as “spontaneous, popular,
and embraced.” 7 His explanation is vague and unclear; was it a planned out aggression
against the Soviet government, or was it a spontaneous event that boiled over? While it is
4

Michael Korda, Journey to a Revolution. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006), 2.
Korda, 103.
6
Ibid, xiv.
7
Ibid.
5
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interesting to hear first person accounts from Korda, it is impossible to completely rely
on everything he has to share. As a Westerner entering into the war zone that was
Hungary, he simply saw it as good versus evil. In no way is he willing to look beyond the
Soviet Union to blame the unimaginable violence that took place those twelve days in
1956.
A later historian named Phyllis Schlafly wrote an article titled “1956 Hungarian
Revolution Lit the Lamp of Freedom” for the journal Human Events in October of 2006.
The article Schlafly presents portrays the Hungarians and those involved in the fighting
as martyrs for democracy, solely blaming the Soviet Union for the atrocities that took
place. The first sentence states: “The revolution started Oct. 23, 1956, as a peaceful
student protest in Budapest, but after Russian soldiers fired on the students, it escalated
into a full-scale revolution against Soviet tyranny,” 8 immediately indicating the direction
that Schlafly’s article is going to take. Schlafly never once mentions RFE or the
propaganda sponsored by the United States as a reason for the unthinkable violence that
ensued, but rather makes statements accusing the Soviet troops as being “trigger happy.” 9
Schlafly even goes as far as to compare the Hungarians to the Founding Fathers of the
United States, stating: “They fought in the tradition of Patrick Henry: ‘Give me liberty or
give me death.’” 10
While Phyllis Schlafly spends a considerable amount of time discussing the
revolution itself, the purpose of her article becomes clear when she ties it back to the
impact it had on the Cold War:

8
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9
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… the valor of the Hungarians who fought in the streets gave courage to other
countries. The dream was rekindled all over Eastern Europe that the day would
come when they, too, might have the opportunity to throw off their captors. The
effect of the Hungarian revolution in the U.S. was dramatic: It changed the debate
about communism and punctured the Communist lie of peaceful coexistence. 11
Schlafly also claims that the revolution of 1956 “started the unraveling of Soviet
communism that finally came to pass in 1991.” 12 While the article is written with
celebrated passion, it is almost difficult for any true historian to read. The wonderfully
glorious light that the Hungarians are portrayed through is reminiscent to those early
historians who were actively involved in the fighting. It solely puts the blame for the
thousands of deaths on the Soviet Union, and sets the revolution on such a high pedestal
that one reading it would think it was the single most important event to ever occur in the
twentieth century. While it does give insight to a small faction of interpretations, the
entire article has to be viewed with extreme skepticism.
Despite the lack of historians that have covered the role of RFE on the Hungarian
Revolution, it is imperative to study the effects that the propaganda barrages had on
Hungarians to fully understand the event. To examine how the broadcasts of Radio Free
Europe influenced the Hungarian citizens to fight against the Soviet soldiers, this essay is
going to analyze transcripts from RFE, conversations amongst high ranking political
officials from the United State, Hungary and the Soviet Union, interviews with
Hungarian Refugees, military surveys conducted by the United States and declassified
CIA documents. Through all of these documents it is clear that the United States
understood the impact that RFE had in Hungary, and how the propaganda could
eventually lead to a violent revolt. Despite knowing the risks of a diminished reputation

11
12
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and potential for uprising, the United States continued their media barrage on all of the
countries in Eastern Europe.
One of the first big decisions that Radio Free Europe had to make was over the
release of Khrushchev’s famous “Secret Speech,” given in February of 1956 in which the
new Soviet leader openly admitted to his parliament that Stalin had committed heinous
crimes of mass murders and unthinkable violence against the citizens who opposed the
Communist regime. In May of 1956 the United States uncovered two copies that were
deemed valid, and thus had to decide what action, if any, to take with them. Ray S. Cline,
an official in the CIA, proposed the release of the full text be made available to the public,
believing that it would create support and proof for the worldwide slander and the foreign
policies the United States had taken against the Soviet Union since the end of World War
II. 13 Frank Winser rejected this plan, and instead implemented the Winser-Angelton act
that would slowly leak portions of the document in an effort to exploit the speech rather
than just presenting it. 14
There were several reasons for the Winser-Angelton act to be used rather than just
the all out release of the speech. The most notable was due to the covert plan called Red
Sox/Red Cap, a project that included the training of refugees from the Satellite Nations
for combat inside Eastern Europe. The Trainees were deemed not ready for battle, and
Winser wanted to wait until the units were combat ready to begin releasing the speech. 15
His reasoning was simple, he knew that the release of the speech would create unrest
inside those nations who would be listening, and the potential for a violent revolution

13
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existed. Until the exiled units were capable of combat with the Soviet soldiers, they
would hold off.
It was slowly becoming clear to all those involved in RFE what kind of impact the
broadcasts could have inside the Soviet bloc. In early 1956 the CIA admitted that they
knew the impact of the propaganda broadcasts could be violent, and at that point in time
they were unable to assist militarily. As it became clear that the end result was more than
likely going to be violent, the CIA knew it might be asked to back up their broadcast with
military help. Lawrence de Neufville, who began working for RFE in 1954, asked his
bosses in Munich:
What happens if a man in a raincoat comes here and says, “We’ve been listening
to all this stuff and we’re ready to start a revolution”? They discussed it in a
special board meeting and they didn’t know what to do… They were all busy
thinking they were doing good and nobody was doing any real plotting. And then
the events caught up with them. 16
Many involved with the United States government feared the same reaction by the
Hungarians could occur. To protect the credibility of Radio Free Europe and in a sense
the reputation of the United States if an incident did take place, the CIA found it
necessary for the United States and Washington to be able to preserve plausible
deniability. 17 Walter Hixson, a historian working for RFE, explained that “RFE had to
foster the illusion of being a genuine private radio station” 18 in order to maintain
credibility to those listening in Eastern Europe.
Despite knowing the risks, the propaganda barrage continued to be ordered by the
United States government and Western European powers. One aspect of the propaganda

16
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operation in Hungary was the use balloons and leaflets with messages to the people. In
Hungary and other Eastern European nations, millions of leaflets were dropped into the
country by balloons presenting statements and propaganda from the West, in particular
the United States. The leaflets presented “inspirational” messages. An example of the
leaflets is:
Czechs and Slovaks, know this: The regime is weaker than you think. Power lies
with the people, and the people stand opposed. With unity and courage, organize
your strength. Down with the collective. Insist on workers’ rights today. Demand
concessions-tomorrow, Freedom. 19
At the same time RFE announced on the air, “The Soviet Union is growing weaker. Only
those will survive who detach themselves from the Communist boat in time…
Everywhere in the Free World your friends are with you…. All power to the people.” 20
Virtually the same effort was done in Hungary under Operation Focus calling for action
to be taken against the Communist regime.
The United States Army created a survey in January of 1956 titled “Hungary:
Resistance Activities and Potentials that analyzed the potential for Special Forces
operations in Hungary. In the report, army officials admit that:
Dissidence and resistance potential appear to be strongest among peasants, whose
continuing opposition has substantially contributed to the failure of the regime’s
agricultural program; youth, whose cynicism and apathy has caused growing
concern in Communist circles; industrial workers, whose disillusionment is
widespread; and the Roman Catholic clergy, the majority of whom have not
joined the regime-inspired “peace priest” movement…. 21
The survey openly admits that there was legitimate unrest amongst the working class and
youth, yet the fliers were aimed toward those with anger and hatred toward the Soviet
19
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regime. The survey doesn’t say whether they believed violent uprising was a possibility
amongst these groups, but they do show that they know who to target with the
propaganda fliers. Whether it was intentional or not, the messages sent in stirred up
support for the anti-communist movement that would eventually become violent.
The incidents’ surrounding the balloon and leaflet drops concerned officials in
Washington regarding RFE and United States reputations. In Czechoslovakia, a load of
several thousand leaflets were accidentally dropped onto the field of a sporting event in
the middle of the action. 22 In Prague the balloons were blamed for a plane crash that
killed twenty two people on January 18, 1956.23 Upon hearing the events in which the
leaflets were blamed for, an official to President Eisenhower was quoted as saying:
The President recalled that both he and I had been rather allergic to this project
and doubted whether the results would justify the inconvenience involved. The
President said he thought the operation should be suspended. I agreed, but said I
thought we should handle it so it would not look as though we had been caught
with jam on our fingers. 24
Throughout the propaganda barrage, the United States attempted to do whatever it could
to keep it’s relationship with Radio Free Europe a secret from the public, for fear that it
would discredit the reports broadcast into Eastern European nations.
As the year went on RFE continued to broadcast propaganda programs designed
to undermine the regime in Hungary, and dissidence amongst the civilians in Hungary
grew even larger. On October 23rd it all boiled over when a rally was planned by the
students of Hungary to protest against the Soviet Union. The Communist leader of
Hungary, Erno Gero, met with his delegation that morning to discuss the planned protests.

22
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From his aides, two vastly different opinions were presented. Jozsef Revai and Gyorgy
Marosan warned Gero that a threat of a revolution was possible, and even likely. The
only possible solution the two men saw was to cancel the demonstrations and to have
security fire on anyone who defied the ban not to protest.25 Lajos Acs, the senior Political
Committee member had a differing opinion. He believed that there was no way a revolt
was imminent, and instead they should try to smooth things over with the protesters by
allowing Imre Nagy back into the government.26 The men compromised, coming up with
the solution to ban the demonstrations, but not to use deadly force.
On October 23rd at 3:00 in the afternoon the protests began, with marchers from
the east and west marching in unison. As the marches went through the city they quickly
gained support by other citizens. As factory workers and working class joined the
demonstrations, the onlookers increased their encouragement. One section of the protests
went to Kossuth Square in front of Parliament, and called for Nagy. 27 As chants of “Imre
Nagy into the government!” rang out, another set of protesters gathered in front of the
Radio station near a statue of Stalin. After several hours of standoff between the
protesters and the AVH protecting the station, violence broke out. At 8:00 p.m. a speech
by Gero denounced the protests angering the crowed of listeners. An hour later at 9:00
p.m. the first shot rang out from the radio station, which was then under siege by the
crowd. After an evening of fighting, the protesters finally took control of the building,
and the start of the revolution had occurred.

25
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As the fighting began between the Soviet troops and the Hungarian citizens,
Washington found itself in the middle of a crisis in which it needed to make a decision on
what action to take. Some officials from the United States argued that the advantages of
intervening were outweighed by the potential of disrupting the political status quo of the
region, which had been running smoothly since 1945. 28 The other argument that many
senior officials shared was the feeling that the United States had an obligation to follow
through with the rhetoric it had been pumping into Eastern Europe, and it was the United
States duty to live up to the expectations of the worldwide public which supported the
Hungarians battle against the Soviet Union. 29 The debate continued when on October 24,
1956 John Foster Dulles called the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot
Lodge, with Washington’s concerns.
We are thinking of the possibility of bringing it to the [UN]SC [United Nations
Security Council]. From a political standpoint, the Sec. is worried that it will be
said that here are the great moments and when they came and these fellows were
ready to stand up and die, we were caught napping and doing nothing. 30
From this message comes a sense that rather than obtain bad press, the United States
government was willing to allow the Hungarians hopeless battle for freedom continue
with innocent bloodshed. Officials were well aware that the rhetoric spread into the
region by the United States and RFE was a huge inspiration to those Freedom Fighters
squaring off with the Soviet Union, but the decision was still made to put U.S. repute
over innocent lives.

28
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The Communist officials of the Hungarian government were also faced with
important decisions on how to end the uprising of the civilians. While the Soviet Union
promised that reinforcements were on the way, officials in Hungary were fearful about
how much support the revolution had garnished throughout the nation. Reports were
flooding in to the leaders that rural citizens were taking arms and joining the fight, at
which point decided that a desperate act was needed to suppress the fighting. On October
28, 1956 the Hungarian Communist party members met to discuss what to do. Among the
thirteen on hand were Janos Kadar, Jozsef Kobol, Erno Gero and Imre Nagy, the highest
ranking Communist officials in Hungary. Kadar began the meeting by stating, “We have
to find a way to get the people who took part in the fighting to lay down their arms
without regarding them [all] as counterrevolutionaries.” 31 The leaders understood that the
best way to get the Freedom Fighters to put down their arms was by making concessions.
However, they were still unwilling to give in to the demands made by those initial
protests, but by softening the punishment to those fighting there was a general hope
amongst the Communist leaders that a ceasefire could be reached.
One member of the Communist party involved in the meeting, simply referred to
as Comrade Mikoyan, suggested “It has to be said more clearly that there were mistakes
in the old leadership…. If we want to be at the leading edge of the workers’ movement,
we must demand that they end the fighting.” 32 The first decision was to have Imre Nagy
once again become the Prime Minister. The hope was to start negotiations between the
new government lead by Imre Nagy and the fighters. By telling them that concessions

31
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were going to be made, and that their uprising was no longer viewed by the Soviet Union
as an uprising, but rather a reaction to past misdeeds, immediate acts of violence would
cease to exist; At the very least until Soviet troops arrived. For the first time since the end
of WWII, the Soviet led Communist leaders began to discuss the process of
desalinization in Hungary.
On October 28, 1956 at 5:25 p.m. new Prime Minister Imre Nagy gave a radio
announcement to the Hungarian citizens about the formation of a new government. His
opening statement was right on cue with the meeting between officials earlier in the day;
During the course of the past week bloody events took place with tragic rapidity.
The fatal consequences of the terrible mistakes and crimes of these past 10 years
unfold before us in these painful events which we are witnessing and in which we
are participating. 33
The speech that followed accused the citizens of criminal behavior, but only as a reaction
to the crimes committed by the previous government. Despite the Soviet Union’s
warnings against it, Nagy also included a section of his speech discussing Soviet
abandonment of Hungary:
The Hungarian Government has come to an agreement with the Soviet
Government that the Soviet forces shall withdraw immediately from Budapest and
that simultaneously with the formation of our new Army they shall evacuate the
city’s territory. 34
Nagy hoped that by announcing on air that a deal had been reached, the Soviet Union
would be forced to abandon Hungary and Nagy’s new government could begin
recuperating the country. Unfortunately, the impression was given to those citizens
listening that the Hungarians triumphant battle against the Soviet regime had been
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successful, and that the Soviet’s exit of Hungary was official. A friend of Nagy, Tibor
Meray, later analyzed the problem that took place after Nagy gave his speech:
It sometimes happens in history that a whole country becomes the victim of an
optical illusion. That was what happened in Hungary. Nagy’s announcement of
the ceasefire order, which he linked this time to a promise that the Soviet troops
would leave the capital, spread drunken joy throughout the country. The little
people of Hungary, who had fought with such indomitable courage, now thought
they had triumphed over the Soviet Union, not only morally but also militarily. 35
The same day that Imre Nagy and the rest of the Communist leaders were
attempting to create some sort of stability and peace, Radio Free Europe was
undermining their efforts. A broadcast on October 28 informed its listener’s military
tactics that were found to be successful against superior enemies. The report began with
carefully edited statements that made it seem as though military support from the West,
mainly the United States, was imminent.
Three days ago we said that every day, every hour gained by resistance is worthy
the sacrifice, lessens the risk. This statement of ours is emphasized by the meeting
of the U.N’s Security council, called together for tonight… The calling together
of the Security Council would have shrinked to a purely formal demonstration if
Imre Nagy and his companions would have liquidated the revolutionary
movement within two days. 36
The impression given was that a decision on what military action the U.N. was going to
take was being discussed that evening. However, the meeting the broadcast was referring
to was the previously mentioned meeting in which the members of the UN were
attempting to figure out a way to separate their names from RFE in light of the revolution
in order to maintain their reputations The encouragement for the Hungarian soldiers to
fight on was ignited by the belief that they were not in the battle alone. They weren’t
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taking part in a revolution, but rather they had just ignited a war with the Soviet Union in
which the rest of the Free World was about to take part in.
To further confuse those Hungarians who were listening to the messages
broadcast on RFE, the report warned that the Soviet Union was sending reinforcements to
put down the uprising. The report added, “According to pessimists these forces will snap
up the freedom fighters in no time. We on the other hand say: let us not be scared of these
numbers indicated as overpowering forces.” 37 The reporter went on to tell a story from
World War II when the Nazis were marching through South-Eastern Europe, where only
500 Serbian fighters “went into action by attaching themselves closely to the marching
German division, popping up on the sides, in front and the rear and by keeping close
contact with each other.” 38 The program wrapped up by saying,
It is by these means and not by a supremacy of arms and numbers that they
succeeded to stop in a decisive place an enemy army which marched towards a
decisive task, causing grave losses without suffering substantial losses
themselves. 39
Following the reports broadcast to the Hungarians it became clear to those outside of the
Satellite Nations that RFE was sending false reports to those listening. The call for action
undermined all efforts for peace that surely would have prevented the revolution from
continuing, resulting in unfathomable loss of life.
Following that program, RFE came back on the air with what later became known
as the famous “Molotov Cocktail” speech. The announcer began the program by
announcing that “we have asked our fellow worker Gyula Patko to report about his own
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experiences, in order to illustrate the possibilities of partisan warfare against tanks.” 40 To
the citizens listening, the impression was still being made that these programs were
sponsored by Western Europe and the United States, and that they were giving military
advice to hold off the tanks until backup could arrive. The actual military advice began
shortly after, with exact instructions for the Freedom Fighters on how to combat the
Soviet tanks. The special guest told stories of how he defeated tanks during his time as
commander during WWII, and suggested that those listening do the same.
One of these methods is in the first place the bottle filled with gas which was, at
the time, jokingly called “Molotov cocktail.” All one needed for this was a wine
bottle of one liter filled with gasoline to which we added a few crumbs of yellow
phosphor and then sealed it tightly…. The moment the bottle broke, the phosphor
set the gasoline immediately on fire and the enormous sucking effect of the
powerful motor did then the rest. The motor caught fire and the tank became
immovable. The crew was forced to leave the tank and our firearms done the
rest.41
The Hungarians were hearing military tactics provided by the U.S., but they were again
being fed more propaganda that was undermining all efforts to end the violence at once.
The West had no intentions of intervening, nor had they ever seriously considered the
proposition to do so.
After the United States and other Western coalition forces failed to respond to the
cries for help by Hungarian citizens, the Soviet troops entered Hungary on November 4th
to put down the revolution. After the twelve days of death and destruction, around 4,000
Hungarians were killed, over 700 Soviet troops were dead and thousands more were
wounded. Over 200,000 Hungarians were forced to flee their homes and search for
shelter from neighboring nations. After the Soviet Union regained power in Hungary,
40
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13,000 Hungarians were imprisoned and about 350 more were executed for their
involvement in the Revolution. Janos Kadar became the Prime Minister, and despite his
attempts at creating a worker-peasant government, the Soviet Union kept a tight grasp on
the politics in the country.
Hungarians were misled by the messages broadcast over Radio Free Europe in the
months prior to the revolution and through the uprising’s entirety. As the students
gathered against the Soviet opposition, messages and speeches rang in their ears that aid
would come from the west. One of those involved in the fighting was an 18 year old male
student in October 1956. After being actively involved in the uprising against the
Communists, he was forced to abandon his home in order to save his life after the Soviets
restored order. The young man, who preferred to remain anonymous, stated in an
interview in 1959, just three years after fleeing his home in Hungary, “Since Stalin’s
death…. All knew then that something will happen. However they did not expect to do
things themselves but the thought of aid and the solution to come from the West.” 42 The
unnamed young man went on to reveal the concern, or lack there of, of Soviet
intervention:
We knew that they would intervene, but we trusted in the West to help us. Ten
years of propaganda has convinced us of this. Had they not intervened, there
would have been no revolution and peaceful readjustment with Moscow would
have been possible. 43
The young man referred to Radio Free Europe as the citizen’s main source of news from
the West during occupation. The broadcasts that were streamed over Radio Free Europe
implied that all the Hungarians had to do was stand up against the Soviet regime and the
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West would take care of the rest. As the rest of the world looked on, it was devastatingly
clear that the Hungarians had no chance of defeating the superior Soviet army. However,
the Hungarians acknowledged that they would not be able to defeat the Soviets as well,
but were convinced the United States would aid them.
Other Hungarians had the same sentiment about the messages they perceived to
be the truth. Another young man helped at the radio station in Budapest as the revolution
broke out. He was actually working inside the Radio Budapest building on October 23rd,
the day protesters and AVO officers clashed to mark the start of the revolution. The
anonymous young man cited the same confusion that many others had from what was
heard on the air from RFE. He also made more serious claims, suggesting that the
broadcasts did more than ignite the nationalistic spirit and pride in the citizens, but
actually directly led to the deaths of innocent Hungarians.
… I have to tell you something about Radio Free Europe. It is a fact that RFE
served a useful purpose. It encouraged us during these 12 years but RFE also
made statements which cost many Hungarian lives. On my way to Austria I met a
Hungarian officer who told me that RFE’s famous declaration, “wait another day,
fight another day, and help will come,” cost him 850 of his men. 44
The direct claim puts into question what the goals of the United States and the rest
of the Western nations that supported RFE were. The creators of RFE, the CIA in
particular, and the Hungarian citizens had the initial belief that RFE was in place to
broadcast unbiased news from democratic nations, but the reports from the area seem to
suggest otherwise. The broadcasts advanced from news updates to political speeches, and
anti-communist propaganda intertwined within it all. Because the propaganda had
advanced to such an extent, many Hungarians saw what they were doing as more than a
44
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revolution, but rather the beginning of a war between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
The question of how such a disaster could have occurred began to be discussed
worldwide. Questions about Radio Free Europe’s involvement in the revolution began to
be discussed. On December 5, 1956 a policy review of RFE during the revolution was
conducted. An internal investigation was done by the RFE political adviser, William
Griffith, in which several conclusions were made. The first conclusion was that “There
were relatively few real policy violations.” 45 Griffith then goes into detail of each of the
policy violations that were committed by the broadcasts. The first he investigates is the
“Armed Forces Special” #A1 of 27 October, which “gives detailed instructions as to how
partisan and Hungarian armed forces should fight,” 46 while also “fairly clearly implies
that foreign aid will be forthcoming if the resistance forces succeed in establishing a
“central military command.” 47 Despite the obvious faults of the programs, Griffith states
that had the program had been done in “theoretical terms without any reference to current
events in Hungary,” 48 then absolutely no policy would have been broken. Griffith goes
on to say that probably the most serious fault of the broadcasts was the tone of the
announcers, and that “too few writers appear willing to admit that the situation inside the
country be so complex that they are not qualified to give listeners specific advice on what
to do.”49
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Griffith concludes that “there is no evidence in the 308 scripts read in this survey
that the VFH [Voice of Free Hungary] could have incited the Hungarian Revolution- i.e.,
caused it to begin.” 50 He also states that “The VFH (with one exception) made no direct
promise or commitment of Western or UN military support or intervention. Its broadcasts
may well, however, have encouraged Hungarians to have false hopes in this respect; they
carefully did little or nothing to counteract them.” 51 Even if just one program promised
directly that the West would intervene, not to mention the countless inferring made in
almost every program, it was done too many times. The Hungarian citizens were basing
their entire uprising on the belief that they were not going to be in the fight alone, and the
West left them to fight a hopeless battle.
However, Griffith feels that the most regrettable mistake made by VFH was,
Not their relatively few policy violations, but their offense against the cannons of
good political warfare and broadcasting technique. They delivered in a bombastic
and imperative tone a message which could have been conveyed in the form of
reports on and repetition of the information coming out of Hungary, particularly
that from the Free Stations. The VFH told Hungarians things they either already
knew or could not in any case have been taught the last minute by radio. 52
Griffith states that the biggest mistake made by RFE in the months prior to and during the
revolution was the tone in which stories were announced. The rhetoric included in the
broadcasts and the direct instructions to fight were merely policy violations that were
unfortunate to take place, but in no way aided to the fighting or inspired a nation to revolt.
However, the false hope that seemed to be included in every broadcast is what was
unacceptable.
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Griffiths seems to be arguing that his broadcasts were viewed as propaganda by
those in Hungary, and that there is no proof that they actually impacted the start of the
Hungarian Revolution. All evidence that exists seems to suggest the contrary, that in fact
the reports and broadcasts spewed over Radio Free Europe directly influenced the start of
the revolution, and fueled it throughout its entirety. Somehow the United States was able
to separate itself from RFE and received very little blame for the bloodshed that occurred.
Throughout the propaganda barrage and even into the start of the Hungarian Revolution,
it was clear that the United States was more worried about its foreign reputation than the
outcome and impact that the revolution would have on the Hungarians. The CIA funded
Radio Free Europe began its propaganda war by broadcasting messages of “freedom”
from the west, encouraging non-cooperation with the Soviet Union. Somewhere along the
line, the messages began to insight anger inside those listening in Hungary, and finally
progressed into messages supporting and encouraging direct violent action to be taken
against the Soviet Union.
Many historians argue that Hungarians themselves didn’t believe the messages
broadcast on air, but rather RFE was only effective in angering the Communist party.
Instead, past historians believe that it was the policies of Stalinism, in particular the
collectivization, rapid industrialization, loss of due process and political purges that took
place. After a brief period of loosening up of policies after Stalin’s death, Imre Nagy
spread a period of hope and improvements for the Hungarians. Historians argue that upon
Nagy’s removal, Hungarians were angered and upset, and that directly led to the
revolution. Even more common amongst historians is to view the Hungarian Revolution
as the rise of freedom against an authoritarian regime. They view the Hungarians as the

Handley 26
underdogs who attempted to go against odds and try to fight for the freedom of their
country. The revolution itself has often been viewed as a heroic event- democracy versus
communism. The Hungarian Revolution was just a segment of the Cold War, not an
individual event that cost nearly 4,500 innocent lives. The view that many historians have
glorifies Western ideals rather than questioning how so many innocent lives were lost.
The views of these historians are skewed, and their values bring into question the
accuracy of their conclusions. Many of the early historians were active members in the
revolution. Of those, most were outsiders, coming into the war zone from Western
Europe or the United States. The only reason that they engaged in the fighting was
because they were fighting for democracy against an authoritarian communist regime. It
is impossible to expect these historians to present an unbiased, truthful representation
about the impact that the democratic governments from the West might have had. Only
recently have historians began to look at the impact that United States funded propaganda
broadcast by RFE had on the revolution.
RFE broadcast messages- created and approved by the CIA- sent messages of
hope and inspiration to take arms and continue their fight against the Soviet Troops. The
propaganda dragged on an event that never should have been started in the first place, and
in the end thousands paid the ultimate price for RFE’s careless journalism. Instructions
were given on military tactics and direct claims were made that the Soviet Union was
retreating and victory was near, and yet RFE has received a free pass. Despite breaking
some “minor” policies, RFE continued to broadcast into the region long after the
revolution, and actually broadcasts in the Middle East today. The initial intent of RFE
was to send unbiased news into the region, and Frank Winser manipulated the station to
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the United States benefits. RFE and the United States should have received more blame
for the unfortunate events that took place in October of 1956.

Handley 28
Bibliography

Anonymous 18 year old Hungarian, interviewed by Donald and Vera Blinkin, Hungarian
Refugee Interviews from 1957-1958,
http://www.osa.ceu.hu/digitalarchive/blinken/index.html.
Anonymous 25 year old Hungarian, interviewed by Donald and Vera Blinkin,
Hungarian Refugee Interviews from 1957-1958,
http://www.osa.ceu.hu/digitalarchive/blinken/index.html.
Barber, Noel. Seven Days of Freedom. New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1974.
Bekes, Csaba. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics. Washington D.C.:
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1996.
Bekes, Csaba, Malcolm Byrne and János Rainer. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: a
History in Documents. Budapest; New York: Central European University Press,
2002.
C.I.A. “Declassified Bulletin: Hungarian Public Demonstrations Lead to Political Crisis,
24 October, 1956.” Open Society Archives.
http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/da/bl/nsa/daily/CIB_19561024.pdf.
--------“Declassified Bulletin: The Hungarian Situation, 26 October, 1956.” Open Society
Archives. http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/da/bl/nsa/daily/CIB_19561026.pdf.
--------“Declassified Bulletin: Western European Communist Reaction to Hungarian
Revolt, 31 October, 1956.” Open Society Archives.
http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/da/bl/nsa/daily/CIB_19561031.pdf.
--------“Declassified Bulletin: The Situation in Hungary, 3 November, 1956.” Open
Society Archives.
http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/da/bl/nsa/daily/CIB_19561103.pdf.
--------“Declassified Bulletin: The Situation in Hungary, 6 November, 1956.” Open
Society Archives.
http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/da/bl/nsa/daily/CIB_19561106.pdf.
--------“Declassified Bulletin: The Situation in Hungary, 7 November, 1956.” Open
Society Archives.
http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/da/bl/nsa/daily/CIB_19561107.pdf.
Congdon, Lee, Béla K. Király and Károly Nagy. 1956: the Hungarian Revolution and
War for Independence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

Handley 29
Cross, William Paul. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: the American Response.
Eastern Washington University, 2001.
Eorsi, Laszlo. Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Myths and Realities. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2006.
Gati, Charles. Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian
Revolt. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006.
Granville, Johanna C. “’Caught with Jam on Our Fingers’: Radio Free Europe and the
Hungarian Revolution of 1956.” Diplomatic History 29, no. 5 (November 2005):
811-829.
---------The First Domino: International Decision Making During the Hungarian Crisis
of 1956. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2004.
---------“Radio Free Europe's Impact on the Kremlin in the Hungarian Crisis of 1956:
Three Hypotheses” Canadian Journal of History 39, no. 3 (December 2004):
515-546.
Guttman, Jon. “The Hungarian Revolution 1956.” Military History 23, no. 10
(January/February 2007): 70-71.
HWP CC Political Committee Meeting, October 28, 1956. In The 1956 Hungarian
Revolution: A History in Documents, edited by Csaba Bekes, Malcolm
Byrne, Janos M. Rainer. Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2002, 253-261.
Korda, Michael, Journey to a Revolution. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006.
Kovrig, Bennet. The Myth of Liberation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1973.
Memorandum of Conversation between John Foster Dulles and U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, October 24, 1956. In The 1956 Hungarian
Revolution: A History in Documents, edited by Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne and
Janos M. Rainer. Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2002, 228.
Mueller, Mary. “Refugee Child: My Memories of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.”
School Library Journal 52, no. 12 (December 2006): 164.
Nelson, Michael. War of the Black Heavens: the Battles of Western Broadcasting in the
Cold War. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1997.
Policy Review of Voice of Free Hungary Programming, October 23-November 23,

Handley 30
1956. In The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents, edited by
Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, Janos M. Rainer. Budapest, New York: CEU Press,
2002, 464-484.
Puddington, Arch. Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000.
Radio Message from Imre Nagy Announcing the Formation of a New Government,
October 28, 1956, 5:25 p.m. In The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in
Documents, edited by Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne and Janos M. Rainer.
Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2002, 284-285.
Radio Program, ‘Armed Forces Special NO. B-1’, Air Date 28 October, 1956. In The
1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents, edited by Csaba
Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, Janos M. Rainer. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A
History in Documents. Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2002, 286-289.
Radio Program, ‘Special Armed Forces B-2,’ Air date October 28, 1956. In The 1956
Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents, edited by Csaba
Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, Janos M. Rainer. Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2002,
286-289.
Saunders, Frances Stonor, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War.
London: Granta, 1999.
Schlafly, Phyllis. “1956 Hungarian Revolution Lit the Lamp of Freedom,” Human Events
62, no. 36 (October 23rd, 2006): 15.
Sebestyen, Victor. Twelve Days: The Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. New York:
Pantheon Books, 2006.
Statement by Joseph Grew to the Secretary General of the United Nations, March 19,
1956.
Study Prepared for U.S Army Intelligence, ‘Hungary: Resistance Activities and
Potentials’, January 1956. In The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in
Documents, edited by Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, Janos M. Rainer. Budapest,
New York: CEU Press, 2002, 86-105.

